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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
lWBJ<~l{'f' JACK HAUETER and 
PHYLLlS HAUETER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant:;, 
V8. 
LIDA C. PRINCE, et al., 




Aweal and Cross-Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Joseph Jeppson, Judge 
N1',\'J1EJ\IENT OF TIU~ KIND OF CASE 
'I'his is an adion by plaintiffs as buyers of an apart-
tnent hons<> undt>r a uniform real t:>state contract couched 
iu tl1t forrn of foreil>le Pntry ag-ain::;t Lida C. Prince and 
William H. Prinee Estak (R. 17-18) Defrndant Lida 
2 
C. Prince counterdaimed and crm;sclai11wd HP(•king t11 
terminate the interest of plaintiff and the othPr defrn<l-
ants in and to the apartment house by reason of tlu•i1 
default under the unifonn real estate contract and for 
money damages for wrongful conversion by sueh parti1·~ 
of personal property. (R. 27-30) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court terminated all interl•sb of all 
defendants except defendant Lida C. Prince in and to 
the apartment house, gave judgment to plaintiffs, declar-
ing that plaintiffs' interest in the apartment house ha<l 
not been effectively terminated and that plaintiff wa~ 
to be given possession of the apartment house and that 
Lida C. Prince had unlawfully detained the premi~e~. 
but there were no damages. The Court further vested all 
interests of plaintiff under the contract in plaintiffs' 
trustee in bankruptcy and gave judgment to Lida C. 
Prince declaring plaintiff to be in default under tho 
uniform real estate contract and declaring that sixty 
days was reasonable time for plaintiffs to have to curP 
the dt>faults and if the defaults were not cured the con 
tract could be tenninated by seller Lida C. Prince. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Lida C. Prince on her cross-appt>al Sl'Pb 
to rPvenw the District Court in its conclusion of unlawfnl 
detainer and seeks to reverse thP District Court in it~ 
') 
•) 
ct1nclrnsiou that the uniform real estate eontract had not 
been (:'ffrdiwly terminated by the written notice of 
default and plaintiff's failure to cure the default. That 
failing, Lida C. Prince seeki'i to uphold the Court's find-
ing ()f no damages and that sixty dayi'i was reasonable 
time for plaintiffs to cun· the defaults. 
S'l'AT1£l\ll£NT OF FAC'L'8 
I' lain tiff Ho he rt .Jack Hauetl>r (then a single man) 
1111 thl' 1-1-th <la)· of l\larch, 1960 t•ntered into a uniform 
real e11tate contract to purchase from "William H. Prince 
(no\\· de('(•ased) and Lida C. Prince, his wife, an apart-
111Pnt house locatPd at 248 vVest Fourth North, Salt 
Lake City, P tali. ( R. 87) 8orne time thereafter plain-
tiffs executed ini'itrmuents in connedion with said 
prnperty to Equitable Corporation and others, which 
conve.rnnces are not matl>rial to this appeal. (R. 88) 
Plaintiffs as purchasers defaulted on said uniform 
n·al estate contract in that: (1) 'l'hey permitteed waste, 
spoil and destruction on the premises and failed to main-
tain 11aid lll'Pltlises in a good eondition (R.. 89); (2) They 
failed to pay the taxes ( H. ~9-90) ; and ( 3) they failed 
to mah the monthly payments of $475.00 due on the 
first of l'ach month for the months of 8eptember, 196-.! 
and each and ewry month then·after, to the date of 
Judgment. (R. 90) On or about Nov0111ber 2-±, 1964 plain-
tiffs J'P<·t>i\'t><l \\'ritten 11otict· from defendant Lida C. 
l'rin<·t·'s attunH·)·, infonlling tht,lll of tlw above referred-
to (IPfaulb and dPdaring that tht>ir rights under tht> 
uniform real estate contract had been tenninatPd in 
accordance with Paragraphs 16(a) of such uniform real 
t·statt• contract. ( R. 90) On or about November 2-1:, 19G-t 
Lida C. Princ1~ reciuested Laverna 8cofield, agent oi 
plaintiffs at said apartment house, to pay thP n•nhi frnt11 
the apartment house to defendant Lida C. PrincP, wl1iC'L 
l\[rs. Scofield did. (R. 76) 
Plaintiffs moved to the state of Orngon in .~11ril 
of 196-! (R. 76, 247, 248) and mailed their month!~· pay-
ments from Oregon to .Mrs. Prince. After the pay llMll 
for August, 19fi4, which arrived August 20, 196-! (R ±31, 
432) l\1rs. Prince heard nothing further from plaintiff~ 
until this lawsuit was commenced in April of 1965. (R. 
432) Plaintiffs contend that approximately Decemlwr 
20, 1964 they contacted Mrs. Prince requesting lwr to 
give tlwm an accounting of the rents from the apartnwnt 
house. (R. 307) Plaintiffs did not ask Mrs. Scofield, the 
agent at the apartment house, for the rents, (R. 271, 
274) and l\1rs. Prince and Mrs. Scofield deny that plain-
tiffs ever contacted them during the period in c1uestiot1 
(R. 394, 432) but the Court made a finding that plain-
tiffs did contact ~frs. Prince about December 20, 19G+ 
and she failed to yield to the request for more than 
three days. (R. 91) 
On April 15, 1965, (R. 17, 18) plaintiffs auwnde<l an 
action that had been pending for nearly two year;:;, (R 
1-3) claiming that l\1rs. Prince had forcibly (•ntl·r<'d the 
apartuirnt hous<'. (R. 17) After four separat" p!T-trial 
eunferenees on the matter from May 9, l!)()(i to ~epten 1 -
lwr Ii, H}(j(j (H. 7-±), the pre-trial judge entered the 
pre-trial ordN listing plaintiffs' claim for an action of 
lidvih!P entr>· (R. 75) and made a determination that 
1
i1aintiffs had no t>videnct• to produce at trial and that 
i 1·a:-11nahk minds rnuld not differ concerning the facts 
aml al'eording!)- di."l111issed plaintiffs' claim for forcible 
11tr:· ll'ith prt>judic<:>. (R. 76) The pre-trial judge set 
1lrl\rn for trial onl)- three issues of the case: (1) De-
f1·1Hlant Lida C. Prince's counterclaim that plaintiffs' 
i11tPre~t in tlw n~19nn real estate contract had been 
prop1•rly M-I~\itik; (2) plaintiffs' claim that the term-
ination 0f tlH• eontract resulted in an unreasonable for-
fPiture amounting to a penalty rather than liquidated 
1lamagPs; (3) defendant Lida C. Prinee's contention on 
th1 ('Olln\pn•laim that plaintiffs wrongfully converted 
it1·1Jl~ of lJPnmnal property. (R. 77, 7S) The pre-trial 
jurlg1• ordt>r<:>d that all pleadings be rnerged in the pre-
trial order and that no amendments be permitted thereto 
<V'P]lt for good eam:;p shown and to prevent manifest 
rnjuRtice. (R. 78) 
Jt tltt> trial tlw trial judge over the objection of 
""
111hwl for Lida l'. Prinee p1,nuitted as one of the issues 
' ' lrir<'ih!P Pntry (R 1 '·"> 1 '''J) 111 . · . oJ-, .:><> le lllatter was tried 
liefon· the Comt without a jury and the Court held, 
atuong· th ti . 0 Pr 11ngs: ( 1) 'l'hat tlw notice of default 




' t·ontrnd; (~) 'L'hat defendant Lida C. 
l 11%· unJ· f ll . 
ai\ n Y cldamt'd thl· premises frolll plaintiff; 
(j 
( 3) That the cost of maintenance of the premises \I a> 
to lw dednded from the rents to determine what, if any, 
damages and that the rnaintenanct' costs had exr<·edpd 
the n•nts, then· fore thf::'re were no damages to ass<'ss; and 
( 4) that plaintiffs wen• in default and the Court liPtPr-
mined that sixty days was reasonable time for })laintiff" 
to cure their defaults, after which defendant Lida C'. 
Prince as seller eould effeetively terminate plaintiff', 
interest in the contract. 
Appellants appeal from 3 and .f above and 1·pspund-
l'nt appeab from 1 and 2 above. Respondent S<'eks tl1i,; 
('Ourt to rPn'rse the judgment of the Distrid l'omt 
and declare that the said uniform real estafr C'ontract 
had been effectively terminated and that there was no 
unlawful d0tainer, and that failing, respondent n•qnPst' 
this Court to sustain the District Court's defrnnination 
that sixty days was reasonable time for plaintiffs to cure 
thP d0fault and that maintenance and opPration coRts 
were pro1wrly dedueted from the rents to determinl' 
damages, if any. 
AHGl"MENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE PARTIES PROSECUTING THIS APPEAL HA \'E 
NO INTEREST IN THE APPEAL AND ARE THEREFORE 
NOT ENTITLED TO ANY RELIEF. 
Tlw judgment in this ease vests all interest of plain-
tiffs in th<'ir trustt>e in bankruptcy who residt•s i11 ()rpgon. 
(H.101) 
-L\ C .. J.S. 51.f provides: 
"'l'lw n•cord 11rn::;t ::;ho\\· that the }Jen;on seek-
1n o· to brino· tlH· appellate proceeding is a proper JH~·t:-' tlwn~o and has a right to maintain it .... 
Om· C'annot tw considered an apptdlant when• 
then· i,; nothing of rernrd to :,;ho\\· an appeal h>· 
Jiirn, and ,;(atf'lllPnb in hrid::; that he has appealed 
\\·ill be ignored." 
The applicahh~ law i::; ::;tated in Alman c. Americwt 
('ar/u{((//11g Corporutio11, :380 Ill. 52±, -!:± N.E. 2d 592, 
:1!1~, where the Court held an attorney could not prose-
rnt1· the ap1H·al on hi::; O\rn. TlH· Court de::;cribed the 
intt>n•,;t 1d1id1 tlH· appellant must have: 
'' ... rrhat interest must be such as to make 
it ap1H'ar that he takes or loses something directly 
hy the judgnH·nt or decree he challenges." (Cita-
tions omitted) 
};pither the Haueten; nor the attorney for Haueters 
hare srn:h an intPrest and the record is devoid of any 
appeal by the trustee in bankruptcy, who is the only 
Jiarty that take::; or lmws :-;orndhing directly by the judg-
lilent. 
POINrL1 N 0 II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERED 
AND ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THE ISSUE OF UN-
LAWFUL DETAINER. 
Tlt1· 1n·e-trial judge, thP I lonorable Leonard W. 
l:Jton \'\'I'\' ("\I' f'1tJ[\· .· [ . ] ti . f" t} . t' • . , P . c·o11:-;1( e1 t't t1· 1:-;:-;ue:-; o u;,; a(• ·1011 
;
11 four tliffrrt'11t pn·-trial l'o11f'l'n·11t.:t·::-;, uvt•r a ]Jeriod 
"r four lllontlrn' time, a11d thl'H l'.onduded as follows. 
8 
"Plaintiffs' second caust~ of action allC'ges an 
action of forcible entry against defendant Lidu 
C. Prince in reference to said apartment 110use. 
Ddendant Lida C. Prince resists said claim. Dm-
ing the several pre-trial conferences, counsel fu1 
plaintiff and counsel for defendant rnadP .otipu-
lations of the following material facts in conm•1'.-
tion with the alleged forcible entry: 
"That vlaintiffs were _purchasing said apatt-
rndent house from defendant Prinee. l\lore than 
seven months prior to November 2-±, 19G-± plain-
tiffs moved to the State of Oregon, making 
arrangenH'nts with one of the tenants in the apart-
uwnt 110m1e, Laverna Scofield, to collect tlw rent 
from the tenants in the apartment housP, and she 
was to give the rents to the sister of the plaintiff, 
Phyllis M. Haueter, when said sister came hy to 
pick up the rents. Laverna Scofield continued to 
deliver the rents to plaintiff's sister whenev<>r 
she came by except for the months of September 
and October and November, 196-±, when plaintiffs' 
judgment creditor, l\Ir. Gilroy, garnished the 
rents. On November 2-±, 19G-±, defendant Lida C. 
Prince sent a letter to the said Laverna :Scofield 
informing her that plaintiffs had defaulted on 
tlwir eniform Real Estate Contract, and that 
future rents were to be paid to defendant Lida 
C. Prince. The said Laverna Scofield complied 
with said request, and paid future rents to de-
fendant Lida C. Prince. Defendant Lida C. Prince 
has never physically occupied the pn_•111ises, nor 
has she changed the method of operation of tlw 
apartnwnt housP. Said Laverna ScofiPld has ('Oll-
tinw·d to <·ollt•d the n-"nts, and the onl.\· dianµ:·.· 
hat-1 been that ::-:he has iiaid the rents to d\-'l'l'IHlalll 
Lida C. Prince instl·ad of to plaintiff's sister. 
"'l'lwn' i::; no evidenee that ean be produced 
at trial to show any force, threats or duress by 
Lida C. Prince against Laverna Scofield. De-
fendant Lida C. Prince conten,d~~jf p~aintiff 
1-Iaueter::; have never made a ~H with her 
since August 21, 1964 (when the last payment 
was sent to her) until this action was commenced. 
Plaintiffs eontend that there ·was some demand 
made on Lida C. Prince for the return of the 
pn~mises by the plaintiffs but were unable to 
recite any evidence that eould be presented at the 
trial to prove such contention. 
"Based on the sti1mlation by the parties of 
tlw material facts, the court believes that reason-
able minds could not differ concerning the fact, 
and that, accordingly, plaintiffs do not have a 
cause of action for forcible entry. The court 
orders plaintiffs' claim for forcible entry be and 
th(' same is hereby dismissed with prejudice." 
(R. 76) 
The correetnes::; of the trial court's ruling is sub-
l'tantiakd by the case of Labco Construction Company 
1. Caldwell, 1± Utah 2d 254, 382 P. 2d 206. In that case, 
as in the instant matter, the plaintiff at pre-trial could 
not indieak any evidencP on the i::;sue and the pre-trial 
judge " ... 11oignantly observed that 'if you haven't got 
nn~- Pvidt'nce on it, I am not going to put it down as 
an is~nw,' and dismissed as to Ross." The Supreme 
Court of Utah in unanimously upholding the pre-trial 
.1udgp'::; ruling stated: 
"l<'or thi:-; Court to rever:-;p the trial court 
undt>r sueh <'i n·umstanePs would deify a mockery 
uf our rules and pre-trial procedure." 
1U 
Likewi::;e in the instant matter, it wa::; 1110ek('JT uf 
our rules and pre-trial procedure for the trial judgt> 1u 
owrrnle the prP-trial judge and con::;ider an issup tliat 
had alread~- !wen fully considt>red and dt>tenuiMd h) 
the pre-trial judge. At the trial the following L'Xtliang1· 
occurn'd in regard to the issue of forcible pntn·: (R l:l~. 
133) 
'!'HE COUR'l': " ... lt is the furtl1Pr filldlllµ: 
of tlw court that the pre-trial judge enh·n'd all 
orclPr that the forcible entrv matter should ilt' 
dismis:wd; that following said order, he consl'IJtPrl 
that tlw matter be reheard by this eomt at the 
hearing. · 
'"l'hP court has determined to hear the issue 
of forcible Pntry. You may take what steps ;·on 
wish. 
''MR. McKAY: Your Honor, 1 \rnuld lik11 
to take l'XCPption to the Court's ruling in n'ganl:i 
to ... 
"MR. MINER: Forcible detainer, not forr-
ible entry. 
"THE COURT: We call it forcible en fr)· 
and detainer. I do not see your point. 
"MR. MINER: All right. 
"'l'llE COURT: I think this "·ill lw pntn" 
However, proceed." 
Then' is no basis for the trial court's stateJllt>nt 
that tht' Jll'P-trinl judge tonst'ntecl that th(' rnatt .. r 11 1' 
rl'!1t•ard, IH•(·ansv tla' }ll'e-trial judge did arnPnd i11 l1is p11n 
hand\\'riting ont• of th(• issue::; (R 77) !mt wad" nu 
11 
(liange j 11 Jii:-: order dis111issing the claim of forcible 
, 
11
trv. lf he had mad(' a change he would have so indi-
1;dc;l in bis pre-trial order. (R. H-78) 
J>laintil'f's ;\ltH~nded complaint against Lida C. 
l'rinrT complains of on!; on<.> wrong: 
"That during tlH' month of April, 196-! the 
defendant Lida C. Prince did wilfully and ma-
liciously take po8session of said building and has 
collected the rents therefrom. She has taken pos-
m;sion \Yithout any right to do so." (R. 17) 
Tlwn' is no alkgation in the amended complaint 
alkging d(•mand or unlawful detainer. During the four 
different prt>-trial conf ert>nct>s plain ti ff s still alleged 
forcible l'ntry, which the pre-trial judge properly dis-
missed. Even at the time of trial the trial judge termed 
the issm· as "unlawful entry." (R. 133) Surely it is 
obvious error for the trial judge to conclude with a 
finding and juclg111ent that defendant Lida C. Prince 
\1a~ guilty of unlawful detainer when the is::me was 
Heither allegt>d in the eomplaint nor was it asserted or 
>d do\\'n as an issUL' in the pre-trial conferences, nor was 
it listPd a:-; an i::-:8Ut' by th0 trial judgt>. Somehow during 
the trial the plaintiffs switched from their claim in their 
u111end<'d complaint of forl'.ible entry during the month 
'
11':\ pril , 1%+ ( H.17) to unlmd'ul clt>tainer t->ometiuw in 
u~11·111hpr of 1%+. (Parngrnpli lli, K ~Jl) (;~VPll if h,Y 
''JIJH· ~trdd1 of th(• irnagiuation tl10 i:-;sue of unlawful 
il"tainer \\'a::; pro1H'rly lwfon· thl' trial court, the fads 
1:2 
a:,; ::-;tipulated by the partie:,; (R. 7G) a:,; LlUOtPd from tlw 
iire-trial order above certainly do not warrant a finding 
of unlawful detainer. 
'J'lw only PvideneP prndueed at trial on tlw 1:,;:,;rn· pf 
unlawful detainer was a disputed ::;tatem<mt by Robert 
Jack Haueter that he said to Jl.Irs. Prince: "l want an 
accounting of the rPnt, and I want the aparhnent hons<· 
hack." (R. 307) Even .Mr. Haueter admit:,; that J\lrs. 
Prince did not refuse him but merely askPd him to go 
see her attorrn•y. ( R 307) l\fr. Haueter further admits 
that he did not eontaet l\Irs. Prince's attorney. ( R. :307) 
In fact, when asked about 'rhether he had ever be<'ll 
refu:,;ed po:,;:,;e:,;sion the exchange wa:,; as follow:,;: 
'"Q. ·wlwn you asked for the apartment lwmw 
back, what did you mean by that'! 
""A. I preswned she had posses:,;ion. 
''Q. And did she deny you that - did :,;he deny 
you this possession 1 
"A. No, she referred rne to you. 
"Q. She never denied you any po:,;session? 
""A. No." (R. 309) 
8uch admi:,;:,;ion by Mr. Haueter conelu:,;ively eliw-
inates any basis for unlawful detainer, especially in tllf' 
light of the stipulated facts that l\Irs. Prince newr 
physically occupied the premises. (R. 76) 'T'he only 
thing l\Irs. Prince did was write a letter to l\lr. Haneh·r's 
agent, Mrs. Ncofidd, wl10 was living at the }Jl'elllis<·S 
and collt>ding tht> rPnts and n•questt>d Mrs. Seofiel<l 
111 g·i\'(' ~In;. Prirwe thv n·nb because of Haueter's de-
lanlt. ,\Jr. llauetL·r adlllib that he never contacted Mrs. 
:-;(·ofiPld about th(' n·nb (R :271) and admits he was 
11 1·\'L'l' rdusL·<l a(huission to the apartrn('nt house. (R. 271) 
If tit(· ahove :stakuwnb of .3lr. Haueter were not 
1·nougli to Pra:se any ('laim for unlawful detainer, surely 
tlil' following llUestion and answer an· conclusive: (R. 
n5) 
"(2. Ml'. Hauetl'l', l am asking you the question, 
did you ewr try to takP physical possession 
of this apartment house, after August 1, 
1964?" 
"A. No." 
'l'ltv 111ost that (·an bv said is that Mr. Haueter claims 
111 Jmvt> m;ked l\lrs. Prince for an accounting of the rents 
IR. 27-J.) his agtmt, Mrs. 8cofield, was giving to the Sher-
iff nndPr garnishment of l\Ir. Gilroy, Haueter's judgment 
1·1wlitor up to November, 1%-J. (R. lGO-lGG) (which garn-
il'h11w11b wPre known to plaintiffs (R. 249, 310) and to 
jlrs. l'rinc(• after N owrnht>r :24, 1964. (R. 76) Surely 
011elt eould not Jw l'on:struNl as unlawful detainer. 
'rhe Court's attPntion is also callt>d to tlw agreement 
l1dwet>n the plaintiffs as Buyer and defendant, Lida C. 
PrineL', as Seller wherPin paragraph lG (a) of said 
l 'nifonu RPal Estate Contrnd plaintiffa m; Buyt>r agreed 
that if Bu_\Pr faik(l to J"t>lllPdy Jpfault \\'ithin five (5) 
<la>:-; al'tl·r n·cl'i1Jt of \HitlL·11 notieP, 8Pller rnay at his 
''i 1tio11 n·-L·nfrr and tak(' po:sst>ssion of said premises 
without legal processes ... the Buyer becoming at on~i· 
a tenant at will of the Seller ... (Exhibit 2). WrittPll 
notice was admittedly received by plaintiffs N ovelllb1·r 
25, 19G4 (R. 2G7) and plaintiff admits that he nevvr 
cured the dt>faults nor made any tender of cure of th1· 
defaults at any time even to the date of judgment (R. +~O. 
421) and the only response to the written notice of de-
fault even claimed by plaintiffs is that plaintiffs alleg;· 
they contacted 1\Irs. Prince for an accounting of the 
rents December 20, 19G4. (R. 307) 
Certainly it was error for the trial court to hold that 
it was unlawful for defendant Lida C. Prince to do th1• 
very thing which plaintiff and defendant had agreed in 
writing in their agreement. 
POINT NO. lll 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING 
THAT THE WRITTEN NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS OF NO-
VEMBER 24, 1964 COMBINED WITH PLAINTIFF'S FAIL-
URE TO CURE DEFAULTS EFFECTIVELY TERMINATED 
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS UNDER THE CONTRACT. 
']'he trial eourt found that the said l'nifonu RPal 
Estate Contract provides as follows: 
"Hi. In the event of a failure to colll])ly with the 
terms hereof by the Duyer, or upon failure of the 
Buyer to make any vaylllPnt or ]Ja)'!llenb ,r)wn 
the samP shall he<'m11e dut->, or within :-W day" 
thereafter, the ~eller, at hi::; option shall haw tht' 
following alternativt· n•medies: 
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",:\. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of 
the Buyer to remedy the default within five 
days after written notice, to be released 
from all obligations in law and in equity to 
<'onvey said property, and all payments 
which have been made theretofore on this 
contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited to 
the ;-.;eller as liquidated damages for the 
non-performance of the contract, and the 
Buyer agrees that the Seller may at his 
option re-enter and take possession of said 
premises without legal processes as in its 
first and former estate, together with all 
improvements and additions made by the 
Buyer thereon, and the said additions and 
improvements shall remain with the land, 
become the property of tht> Seller, the Buyer 
becoming at once a tenant at will of the 
;-.;ellt·r. .. '' (R. 89) 
rl'he trial court found plaintiff as purchaser had 
defaulted on said Uniform Real Estate Contract in that: 
(1) He permitted wa:,;te, spoil and destruction on the 
]ll'Pllli:,;es and failed to maintain said premises in a good 
l'Ondition (R. 89); (2) He failed to pay the real and 
!IPl'60nal property taxes for several years (R. 89-90); 
anrl (3) He failt•d to make the monthly payments of 
$-1-7G.OO (htP mi the first of Pach month for tht> months 
uf Se11ternlJl'l', 1 ~)()-1-, aml l'<t<.:h and t-wry month thert>after 
to tl1e datt> of the judgwt•nt in this matter. (R. 90) 
Hi 
l\lr. Haueter clearly adrnitted that he recL•ived \\l'it 
ten notice from defendant Lida C. Prince on "N overnlh·J 
25, 196-t, notifying him of said defaults. (R. 2li7) On 
pages -±20 and -±21 of the record Mr. Haueter clearh 
and unequivocally admitted that afkr he reeeived thi' 
letter notifying him of the defaults, he madP no efforl 
to cure them: 
"Q. (Mr. McKay): After you receiwd thi8 lett~r 
did you ever off er any uwm·;· to I\lr:" 
Prince1 






MR. MINER: Just answer yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: I am sorry. No. 
(Mr. McKay) After you received this lettu, 
did you attempt to make any repairs in the 
Prince Apartment House? 
No. 
After you received this letter did you ewr 
attempt to pay any taxes on tht' Prin('!' 
Apartment House~ 
No." 
By Mr. Haueter's own testimony he adrnit8 that 1ll' 
never made any tender to cure the defaults and that 
aJJproxirnafrly onP month passPd twfon• ht• rnadl, n11 ' 
inquiry in regards to tlw aparb11P11t lwmw. By the tcnn' 
of the contract he was required to cure an;· default~ 
11Jtli1n fin cla:-·:::; aftt•r receipt of \\Titten notice and his 
lailun· to do so would result in a termination of his 
1ight nncl<'r the contract. He was fully advised of the 
,Ji.fanlb, lw 1n1s fully advist~d that Lida C. Prince as 
<1·l!Pr had elecfrd to terminate his rights under the con-
tract pmsnant to paragraph Hi(a) of the contract and 
]11· faikd t() cme the defaults within the time specified 
;11 tlw contract and therefore by the terms of the con-
1 rad all (If his rights had heL·n terminated. 
Till~ avplicable law is stated in the case of Foxley 
1. Rich, 35 lTtah 1G2, 99 P. 6GG, 672, where the Utah 
~u1n·<'lll<' Court held that a buyer's interest had been 
1 ll'1·clivel~· tNrninated. The court stated: 
" ... ·wiwre the parties tlwmselves stipulate 
11 ltat the re:mlt of a breach of a particular con-
tract shall be, the courts ordinarily have no au-
thority to impose othPr consequences than those 
agreed upon .... " 
The ahovl' rule \\'as again approved by this Court in 
Huse I. Ourn, 3G rtah 333, Ull P. 6-±5, G-±7. 
rn l'\'g"anl to the tiim· to he allowed buyer to cure 
1hfaults, see Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 113 
l'tah -t03, 195 P. 2d 7-±8, where this court considered 
1h1· adual time and not just the :::;tated time in the notice. 
Plaintiffs had apprnxirnatPl~, onP month between the 
ti1w· tl1l·.1 l'P("l'i VL'd tlH· not ice and tlH· time tlwy allege 
111 lia1·(· 111adP <·ontact ll'ith Mrs. Prince. This court 
l~ 
in the Stewart case held 23 days actual time (7 days 11 as 
given in notice) was reasonable to cure over 11 monthly 
delim1uent payments. In the Stewart case this court 
also considered the faet that the lmyt>r vrobabl)· ('ouldn't 
have cured the default even with longer tinw, whi('h 
is also present in the instant case. 1\f r. Haueter admittPd 
he could not make the payments due l\1 rs. Prince without 
receiving the rents (R. -118) and the rents were bc-ing 
garnished under a judgment of $39,999.00, (H. -n:i\ 
which would not he satisfied for a long tirnc. 
A case in JJOint is Federal La11d Bank uf Berkeley 
'V. Sorenson, 101 Utah 305, 121 P. 2d 398, 400, where tlm 
Court held that a notice by the seller almost identical to 
the notice given by seller Lida C. Prince in this case 
did in fact effectively terminate the contract. 'rhe buyer 
in that case argued that the notice had to state within 
the notice that the seller had until a certain date to 
pay arrearages. This Court refused such argu11wnt by 
stating "Such is not th1:• contract nor is it the rule or 
practice." 
Seller Lida C. Prim·p hy tlw noticl' of Novernlwr 
:2-t, HH.i-1- cuu1Jled \\ith Haut>h~r's failul'\' to ('Ul'e tlw de 
faults did in fact L•ffectiveh· terminate the l'ontract and ' . 
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n1t Mrs. Prinee in a position where an action for a writ 
of possession would lit', hut inasmuch as Haueters were 
11ot in possession, an action was not necessary and Mrs. 
Prince peacPahl)· ohtained the n•nts from Haueter's 
ilg1·nt, I\Lrs. S<'ofield. 
See abo Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 12±, 270 P. 
~d 4---1-:2, where this court sustained a judgment that held 
that a huyer's interest had been terminated when he 
failt>d to Clll'P the default within the time specified. 
Tlw trial court apparently had the mistaken idea 
tliat a second notice was required in order to terminate 
the contract. A second notice would only be required if 
.\frs. Prince were attempting to charge plaintiffs with 
unlawful detainer. All Mrs. Prince is attempting to 
clarify with the court is that the contract had been 
1·ffrctively terminated. Possession and unlawful detainer 
\\We not an issue because neither Mrs. Prince nor the 
Haueters had possession of the premises. They both 
merely accepted the rents which were collected by their 
agent, .Mrs. Scofield, who resided at the apartment house. 
1'lw record is completely devoid of any evidence of any 
agTPement or any factual situation which would require 
that tlw notice be for more than five days, as agreed 
in tl11' l'(mtrnd. 'J1herefort>, the contract was properly 
l1·n11inatPd hy Lida C. Prinee an<l Haueters have no 
l'ight, titlt> or inten•st under the contract or to the prop-
, rt~- and it was error for the trial court to hold that the 
:2U 
contract had not been effectively terminatc>d, and tJ 1, 
trial court should be reversed and judgment should 1i1• 
entered in favor of defendant Lida C. PrincL•, holdin~ 
that the contract had been properly terminatt·d and 
plaintiffs have no rights under the contract. 
POlN'f NO. L\' 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PROPER FORMU· 
LA FOR DETERMINING DAMAGES IF THE FINDING OF 
UNLAWFUL DETAINER IS HELD TO BE PROPER 
Finding No. 7 of the Court, which is not even 
alleged by plaintiffs to be in error, found: "Plaintiff a> 
purchaser defaulted on said uniform real estate contrad 
in that he permitted waste, spoil and destruction of 
the premises and failed to maintain said premises in a 
good condition." (R. 89) 
Finding No. 19 provides: ''The necessary expendi-
tures for the maintenance of the premises expended by 
defendant Lida C. Prince in the amount of $12,316.3i 
exceeded the gross rents received from the apartment 
house during such period, which amounted to $10,-±84.0L" 
(R. 91-92) The Court in the previom; finding found that 
"Defendant Lida C. Prince after N" ovember 2-1-, 19G-! mad~ 
certain repairs to the lJrernist>s, all of which wen• reason 
ahle and neet•ssar~· repairs to the pn;111ises. Said repa!l' 
amounted to a total of $12,31G.37 ." ( R. 91) 
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Tlw formula used by the Court in eomputing dam-
ag1·;,; is appan·nt in Condusion N" o. 10, where the Court 
.i~drn·tPd tlw n·awnable necessary repairs from the 
a1110u11t of n·nb reePived and eonduded inasmuch as the 
rqinirs and rnaint<:>nance had exeeedt•d the rents that 
iltl'l'l' \H'l'P no damage::->. ( R. 93) Paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
th1· jndglltPnt (R 85) condusively sho"· in the judgment 
lliat the same formula was used, i.e., deducting the 
n·asonable and necessary repairs from the rents received 
1luring the iwriod when .l'IIrs. Prince collected the rents, 
to d\'t(·i·rninv what, if any damages, had been sustained. 
'l'hP vel')' ca::-;e which plaintiffs assert in their brief 
dl·arly states that to be a correct formula. The Utah 
SupremP Court in the case of Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 
rn, 292 P. 206, 211 held that the measure of damages 
\\'as: 
"1'he damage::-; which may be recovered in an 
aetion ::-;uch a::-; thi::-; one are measured by the rule 
that they must be the natural and proximate con-
sequences of the act::-; complained of and nothing 
more. Rents and profits or rental value of the 
prPmisPs during dl'tPntion are included in dam-
ag·Ps. (Citations omitted) Jt is the rental value 
of ilH· prPrnis\"S as a wltolP (an apartment hou::-;e) 
ll'l1id1 is the lo:,;s suffen"d by plaintiff. Had she 
lwen in pos:,;pssion durinb" the period complained 
·)·) 
of, the expense of management and 01wratiun 
"'ould have been borne by her. rrhe n•asonalil·· 
value of the use and occupation would lie 111ark 
up of tlw gross rental value of th<' seHral apart-
ments, and deducting from sueh sum a im>pPr 
allowance for sueh expenses as manag<'llll'nt, col 
lection of rents, repairs, h<:·ating if at the cxpen,,c 
of the operator of the house, allowanct> for vacan-
cies, watt>r rates and such items, if ap1mipriatc 
as applied to the operation of this apartrnf'nt 
house. Such ex1ienses would be borne h.\' tlw p0r-
son operating the house, wheth('l' plaintifl'ti 01 
defendants, and must be dt>ducted from tlte total 
rents to arrive at a fair rental value of the wholP 
liroperty. The wisdom of the rule is well illus-
trated by applying it to a hotel or office build-
ing. Certainly no one would contt>nd that the 
fair value of an office building would be merely 
the sum of the rental value of all t11e rentable 
rooms .... " 
Plaintiffs on their appeal ar_e attempting to hare 
the court give them damages measured only on the rents 
without ch•ducting the maintenance costs '.vhich the Ftali 
Supreme Court, as above quoh•d, specifically held could 
not be donE>. 
Plaintiffs also ehallenge th<' rPasonablt>iwss and 
necessity of thE rnaintenance co» ts. 'l'hP a pvlicable la1r 
is " ... that wl1en~ fimli11gs and judgJtH•11t are supported 
lw sulrntantial evidenet• thev eannot bL' disturbed ou . ' . 
<i!J[ll'Cll." I l'ulrnrc(· I. }Jitters, 1:2 Ctah :2d ul, 3G2 P. 2<l 
~~7, -!:2U) 
Till' Court\; fimlings that the expenditures made by 
J.ida l'. Prirn·t~ on said premise::; were reasonable and 
JH'rl·ssar)· rl'pairs and maintenance i::; well ::;ubstantiated 
h1· tlw record. Ii:ven plaintiff'::; witnes::;, Eli D. LeChem-
inant, who was qualified as an expert by plaintiff's 
('nLms(·l, tt>t'tified that Apartiuent No. 2 needed a com-
Jiide rPnovating job (R. 225); that regular operating 
1•:qwnsPs alone without maintenance would be $2,367.00 
i11·r yPar (R. :230, 231); and further frstified in regard 
111 tlw r<>asonahlt•rn•s::; and nece::;sity of the repairn: 
"Q. Wlwn .''OU ::;a.'' defern•d ma.intenancl', what 
do you mean1 
"A. T mean apartment::; neglected; they had to 
go through all of them. In the past they 
were m'glected and this Ja::;t year required 
an excessive amount of work. 
"l\f y only knowledge of that is I have seen 
the Olll' apartment that has not been completely 
redone, and all I can as::;ume is that the other 
apartnwnts were in similar condition, now they 
are in good condition." (R. 235) 
"\Lrs. :::lcofield, the part)' who livPd in the apartment 
lions\• during all tirnt>s im}Jortant herein a.nd who was 
'1 11 • ag·\·llt for plaintiff::;, S[H'l·ifieally tPstified of the need 
1111 · 1 IH· n·pai n; arnl 1nai1itenam·p and their reasonable-
11' ' ' ( H. %:i-:1u~, :3:-l9-3~l5) 
Mr. l~dward E. \Vestra, anot1wr PXpert of plain-
tiffs, testified in regard to expenses and that the out~i<l!· 
painting alone would be $1,000.00 (R. 212, 213) Also 
Lida C. Prince testified in detail of the condition 11 : 
the a partrnent house November 24, 19()-± and !ht• n~tii 
for repair. (R. 430-431) Donald R. Chisholm, a real 
estate manager, testified of the expenses, (R. 379-383) 
and identified Exhibit No. 16 which listed the expendi 
tures and he identified them as maintenance Pxpern;es. 
(R. 382) \Vayne Prince identified as maintenance co~li 
( R. 384-385) Exhibits 13 and 14, which gives all th~ 
cancelled checks and attaches all of the vouchers, show-
ing each expenditure and the person to whom it was 
paid and for what purpose. The Court could easily and 
did properly make the finding that the expenditnm 
made, both as to amount and as to items, \Vere reasonabk 
and necessary and proper deductions from any rent' 
received in determining the measure of damages. 
ln regards to the triple damages, it is ~rnfficient to 
state that if there are no damages certainly tiipling no 
damages cannot produce some damages. 
POINT NO. Y 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERI\IINED THE 
DEFAULT OF PLAINTIFFS AND THAT SIXTY DAYS WAS 
A REASON ABLE TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO CURE THE 
DEFAULTS. 
Plaintiff-ap1w1la11t:-; in Point 111 ot' thPil' uril'f t•ull-
tend that the Court Pned in granting the defrndant tlw 
11glit tu charg(• tlH· idaintiffa interest and taxt•s during 
i!li' ti1111· that thv (kfrnclant was in possession of the 
[il'lllJCl't.\', 
:-\1wl1 ('OJJli'lltioH ull the i>art uf plaintiffs is eorn-
plvt(·l:· without rnerit. 'l'he judgrnent entered by the 
C'onrt on the l+th day of December, 1966 (R. 86) as 
further lirnitecl by the deletions specified in the order 
ril \larch 13, 1967 (R 112-113) has no charge against 
iiJaintiffs for interest as allPged in }Jlaintiffs' Point No. 
TII. 1'hP order of l\Iarch 13, 19G7 only found the amount 
1.hw as of N" ovember 2+, 19G-1, which is hefore Mrs. Prince 
,,Jitained an:· rents. The order reads: 
"'l'lw Court finds and orders on stiplation by 
the parties that the balance due and unpaid on 
the uniform real estatP contract at issue in this 
rnatter was $3'7 ,2+2.22 as of November 24, 1964, 
including taxes and interest to said date." (R. 112) 
Plaintiff is merely allPging something that is not in the 
judgment, nor is there any computation where such inter-
1 .. ,t and tax<·s being complained about are part of the 
iudg111Pnt. Plaintiffs' counsel stipulated to the amount 
that was still due under the eontract and no determina-
tion was ewr made in th1, ,judgment by the Court in 
1Pgards to amounts afkr Novernber :24, 196-1:. (R. 112) 
lnasrnuel1 as th1~ d1•ter111ination of the amount owed 
11 a~ li~· ;.;tipulation of counsel for plaintiffs, surely plain-
liff, l'annot eo111plain of thl' rpsult thereof. 
ln n•gards to plaintiffs' Point I\" on ap1wal, tl 1, 
Court ·was proper in setting sixty days as a reasonabli 
time within 1Yhich plaintiffs must cure the default~ 01 
b~~ a tenant at will. The record clearly indicates that 
the trial court fully considered the rnath>r and the Comt 
found: 
"Upon motion of defendant and the Comt 
having heard arguments of the parties, the Court 
finds and orders that plaintiffs should have sixty 
days from the date notice is given to thrm 1J1 
defendant to cure the defaults and hring thr c·on-
tract up to date or the contract will be terminatrd 
and the plaintiff-buyers will be tenants at will.'' 
( R. 112-113) 
'l'he Court had before it the uniform real e~tatt 
contract wherein the parties had mutually agrerd that 
if the buyer failed to remedy the default within five day~ 
after receipt of written notice the seller was released 
from all obligations in law and el1uity to convey the 
property. (Exhibit 2) Surely that is a factor in deter· 
mining the amount of time the defaulting buyer should 
have in which to cure defaults. 
'l'he Court was also aware of plaintiff's h·stimony on 
pages 4-20 and -t-21 of the record where plaintiff unt>quir-
ocably admitted that he had never tendered any cur" 
of the defaults even by the time of trial. 
It was appan~11t that plaintiffs wen· not waking all~ 
::-;erious efforts to make any tt>nder to cure default:,;, ew11 
:11 u )\'<ll':' ai'tvr tht> admitted ddault and nearly two 
11·ar::; aft<'r n·ePipt of notice of the default. The Court 
,]i(111ld abo not<' that the trial concluded October 7, 1966, 
,,nd tht> Conrt gave the parties his judginPnt at that time. 
Thl'n·fon·, plaintiffs knew of the court's ruling and knew 
·ii' th1· <h·l'anlts and knew that they had to cure the 
(Hanlts Oetoher 7, HHiG. 8uch was again confirmed by 
t!1(' \\Titten judgment filed December 14, 19G6. (R. 84) 
lln till' 13th clay of March, 1967, the Court put the final 
tim<' limit 011 iilaintiff':,; continued defaults as sixty days 
from t lw time 11otiee "·as given from Lida C. Prince to 
plainti ['f's. ( Il. 112) Lida C. Prince gave the written 
notii'P thl' 20th clay of 1\[arch, 1967 and the trustee in 
hankrnpte:> ( tlw real party in interest) and plaintiff's 
attorm·y n•eeiwd the same the 21st day of March, 1967 
11ith the sixty days ending 1\lay 20, 19G7. 
Plaintiffs had from October 7, 19G6 until May 20, 
l'.lli/ in \\·hieh to eme the ddaults, "·hich is over seven 
111l1ntlis. 
l'li<· L:talt statutes give only six months for redemp-
tion of real property under either a mortgage (Rule 
1IH(fl(:l) F.C.A. 1953) or a trust deed. (78-37-7 U.C.A. 
l~J.i:i) Snrt>ly the Court in the instant matter has not 
···t an nnrPasonahle length of timP for curing defaults 
11111·11 thP total till\\' allmn·d plaintiffs from the date of 
!lld!!;Jlll'llt until the ti111v the contrad wa::; finally termin-
'1l1·d \\a:-> in <·xeess of the time allowed by statute for 
redeeming property under a foreclrnmre. Hedernption 
from foreclosure n•quin•s payment of the total rernaini 11 ~ 
balanee, whPn·as in this case plaintiffs WPn• on!)- 11 ._ 
quin·d to c·un· th\• defaults, \Yhieh \rn::; a :-;ulista11t1all 
les::w r arnoun t. 
Even though the time from the date of the \\'ritt1·n 
order was less than six months, it was sixty days, whirl1 
was far in excpss of the amount of time whiC'h had b1·1·n 
agreed upon b~- the parties, i.e., five days, i11 1rhi1·!1 
the buyer was required to cure the defaults after n·c'l'i)lt 
of written notice. (Exhibit 2) 
The Court's attention is called to Paragraph 9 nl 
the judgment, where the District Court held: 
"Defendant Lida C. Prince has not waiwd 
any of her rights to requin~ timely perfonnane1 
of said Fnifonn Real Estate Contract from thi' 
time forward." (R. 86) 
A case in point is Pacific Development Cu. i·s. 8tc11-
art, 113 Ftah -1:03, 195 P. 2d 7-18, where this court in 
considerino· n·asonable notiee eonsidered tlw adual ti1n1 /:) 
which the bunr had to cure the default and not ju~t 
the time specified in the notice and hPkl that the actual 
time of 23 days to cure muuProus monthly payrnenb 1n1' 
reasonable. 
'd I 'l'he Court in the said ~tewart easP abo eon~1 ere'' 
tlw factor that buy Pr never madc> any tender orcr :i 
. 11;; iwriod of ti11H· and that buyPr was not in a position 
111 1·nrP tltP d<>faults in any event, which factors are 
1 1111·.-;pnt in tlw instant case. 'l'rustee in bankruptcy has 
1111 111om'Y in tlw estatt' with which to cure the defaults. 
\Yith tlwse factors prest>nt tlH· requirenwnt irnpost>d 
"' tlt1• Court wa!'i pro]H'r and reasonabl<> and if anything, 
\\rn l1·ni(•nt on th(• Jllaintiffs and ::should })l' upheld. 
SUl\ll\fARY 
Tlie parfa•:,; prosPeuting this appeal have no direct 
~ntl·rt·si in tlw appeal, therefore are entitled to no relief. 
The trial court should he reversed on its finding of 
m1la\\'fnl dPtainer and this court should hold that the 
nniform rPal estate contract was effectively terminated 
11) ~el!Pr Lida C. Prince's notice of default::; and buyer 
Haueter's failnre to Clll'\c' the defaults. That failing, this 
11 1mt :slwuld uphold the trial conrt'ti finding that there 
''l'l'I' no damages and thai sixty days was reasonable 
•i111v for lmyl'l'S to cure the admitted defaults. 
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